

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----071856Z 059591 /41

R 071728Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1318  
INFO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 03798

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, SU, SA  
SUBJECT: SUDAN: PROPOSAL FOR NUMAYRI AND SADIQ  
RECONCILIATION

SUMMARY: KHALIL OSMAN MAHMOUD BELIEVES THAT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOW RIGHT FOR A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT NUMAYRI AND SADIQ AL-MAHDI. HE SAYS SADIQ AND NUMAYRI ARE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE ASSURANCES TO END THEIR QUARREL, WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT AS GUARANTORS; SAUDI OFFICIAL KAMAL ADHAM WOULD BE THE BEST INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE TWO SUDANESE, AND WOULD LIKELY TAKE ON THE JOB IF ENCOURAGED BY US. END SUMMARY.

1. KHALIL OSMAN MAHMOUD CALLED AT THE EMBASSY MARCH 4 OUT OF CONCERN FOR WHAT HE SEES AS A DETERIORATING POLITICAL SITUATION IN NORTHEASTERN AFRICA. IN A LENGTHY ANALYSIS, HE DESCRIBED SUDAN'S KEY POSITION AMID A SWIRL OF RIVALRIES IN THE MIDDLE  
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EAST AND THE HORN. HE BELIEVES THE PRESSURES OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION ARE UNDERMINING SUDAN'S STABILITY AND UNITY AS WELL AS NUMAYRI'S CAPACITY TO SURVIVE. HE CLAIMS THAT HE HIMSELF CAN BE A MAJOR INSTRUMENT IN REVERSING THESE DANGEROUS TRENDS.

2. OSMAN EXPLAINED HIS LONG PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP

WITH BOTH NUMAYRI, WHOM HE HAS ADVISED CLOSELY OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS, AND WITH SADIQ AL-MAHDI, AN OLD FRIEND WHOM HE HAS SEEN FREQUENTLY DURING HIS BUSINESS TRIPS TO LONDON. DURING HIS LAST CONVERSATION WITH SADIQ TWO WEEKS AGO, OSMAN SAYS HE FINALLY CONVINCED HIS FRIEND TO SEEK A RECONCILIATION WITH NUMAYRI. HE PERSUADED SADIQ THAT THE SOVIETS, THROUGH THE LIBYANS, WERE USING SADIQ AS A TOOL OF THEIR OWN DESIGNS AND THAT COOPERATION WITH THEM COULD WELL MEAN THE UNDOING OF SADIQ AND THE SUDAN. HE ARGUED THAT SADIQ, AS A CONSERVATIVE, PRAGMATIC, RELIGIOUS MAN, WAS SIMPLY IN THE WRONG COMPANY AND RIDING AN UNCONTROLLABLE TIGER. AT THE END OF THE TALK, SADIQ WAS PREPARED TO REACH SOME FORM OF COMPROMISE WITH NUMAYRI.

3. OSMAN SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN NUMAYRI FOR SEVERAL MONTHS BUT THAT HE COULD TAKE SADIQ'S SIGNAL TO KHARTOUM AT ANY TIME. NUMAYRI, HE BELIEVES, IS ALSO READY TO SETTLE WITH SADIQ BECAUSE OF THE THREAT POSED BY TRIPOLI-ADDIS INTRIGUES AND BECAUSE HE RECOGNIZES HOW LITTLE PRACTICAL SUPPORT HE CAN COUNT ON FROM EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA IN A MOMENT OF CRISIS.

4. OSMAN SAID A RECONCILIATION CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH AN EXCHANGE OF ASSURANCES BETWEEN SADIQ AND NUMAYRI, UNDERSIGNED OR GUARANTEED BY EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA. SADIQ WOULD REQUIRE AN AMNESTY FOR HIS FOLLOWERS AND THE PROMISE OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. ON HIS CONFIDENTIAL

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SIDE, NUMAYRI WOULD WANT SADIQ'S WORD THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ATTEMPT TO OUST HIM FROM THE PRESIDENCY. OSMAN SUGGESTED THAT NUMAYRI WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH AN UNOPPOSED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THAT WOULD GIVE HIM A SIX-YEAR TERM. ALTHOUGH SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT GOOD FAITH ON BOTH SIDES, OSMAN SAID THAT SUDANESE POLITICS HAS ALWAYS WORKED THAT WAY AND THAT NUMAYRI AND SADIQ WERE PREPARED AND EVEN ANXIOUS TO ENTER INTO SUCH A BARQAIN.

5. OSMAN SAID THE SAUDIS WOULD BE THE BEST BROKERS FOR THE DEAL, AND SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED KAMAL ADHAM AS THE MAN WHO COULD WORK OUT BOTH THE ASSURANCES AND THE GUARANTEES. ADHAM KNOWS BOTH PARTIES AND COULD ALSO BRING SADAT INTO THE ARRANGEMENT. (OSMAN MENTIONED SEVERAL TIMES THAT SADAT COULD NOT MOVE FORWARD POLITICALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IF HE WERE DISTRACTED BY TENSIONS IN THE SOUTH.) OSMAN SAID

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R 071728Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1319  
INFO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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THAT HE AND ADHAM HAD HAD PERSONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE PAST AND THAT FOR THE MOMENT HE WOULD HESITATE TO APPROACH ADHAM DIRECTLY. HE SAID HE KNEW THE AMERICANS WERE CLOSE TO ADHAM AND SHARE THE SAME FEARS ABOUT THE POLITICS OF SUDAN. HE THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT WE COMMUNICATE OSMAN'S WORDS TO ADHAM AND ENDORSE THE AIM OF A SADIQ-NUMAYRI RECONCILIATION. IF ADHAM WERE INTERESTED, THEN OSMAN SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER WAS ASKED OF HIM.

6. COMMENT: THIS IS OUR FIRST CONTACT WITH OSMAN ALTHOUGH HIS REPUTATION IN HIGH FINANCE IS WELL KNOWN. WEHAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SADIQ AND NUMAYRI NOR HIS PERSONAL AND ECONOMIC INTEREST IN A STABLE SUDAN. HIS PRESENTATION WAS MODEST AND CONCERNED. OSMAN IS NOW AWAY ON A BUSINESS TRIP BUT SAID HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY ON HIS RETURN. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE WILL SUGGEST A MEETING BETWEEN AN EMBASSY OFFICER AND SADIQ. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ADDRESSEES' REACTIONS  
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TO HIS COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPARTMENT ON  
HIS PROPOSALS.

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## Message Attributes

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